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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of internal migration and remittance flows on wealth accumulation 
and distribution in 51 rural villages in Nang Rong, Thailand. Using data from 5,449 households, 
the study constructs indices of household productive and consumer assets with principal 
component analysis. The changes in these indices from 1994 to 2000 are modeled as a function 
of households’ prior migration and remittance behavior with ordinary least squares, matching, 
and instrumental variable methods.  The findings show that rich households lose productive 
assets with migration, potentially due to a reduction in the labor force available to maintain local 
economic activities, while poor households gain productive assets. Regardless of wealth status, 
households do not gain or lose consumer assets with migration or remittances. These results 
suggest an equalizing effect of migration and remittances on wealth distribution in rural 
Thailand. 
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To evaluate the economic impact of migration flows, researchers study the amount and 
distribution of remittances, funds and goods sent by migrants to their origin families and 
communities. Remittances from international migrants amount to US$325 billion annually, far 
exceeding the volume of official aid and approaching the level of foreign direct investment flows 
to developing countries in 2010 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2011). These flows are critical for 
understanding the economic trends in the developing world; thus, several studies have evaluated 
their impact on the receiving economies (Acosta 2008; Adams and Page 2005; Koechlin and 
Leon 2007). But most of these studies have relied on macro-level data, and focused only on 
remittances from international migrants. 
 
This study builds on the recent body of work that has employed micro-level survey data to 
investigate the impact of migration and remittance flows in origin communities (Garip 2012; 
McKenzie and Rapoport 2007), but takes a mixed-methods approach in an internal migration 
setting. The study first uses qualitative data obtained from focus group discussions with 
migrants, migrant-sending household members and village leaders in 8 rural villages in Nang 
Rong, a relatively poor district and a major supplier of migrants to urban regions in Thailand. 
These data suggest migration and remittance choices may have differential effects depending on 
households’ initial economic positions.  
 
To test these hypotheses systematically, I exploit longitudinal survey data from 51 rural villages, 
which record the migration and remittance choices of 5,449 households prior to 1994 as well as 
households’ asset holdings in 1984, 1994 and 2000. To measure households’ economic positions 
over time, I use Filmer and Pritchett’s (2001) method, and create an index of household wealth in   3 
1994 and 2000 based on principal component analysis of 14 asset indicators in the pooled data. I 
compute separate indices for productive and consumer assets, which differentially shape long-
term economic trajectories (Brown and Alhburg 1999; Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996b; 
Massey  and Parrado 1998; Papademetriou and Martin 1991). 
 
I employ regression analysis to link the changes in households’ productive and consumer assets 
from 1994 to 2000 to prior migration and remittance behavior. I estimate separate models for 
poor, medium-wealth and rich households, as well as for changes in productive and consumer 
assets. Because households do not choose migration and remittance strategies randomly, I 
consider two alternative models (matching and instrumental variables) to ordinary least squares 
to correct for potential sample selection bias. 
 
The results confirm the hypotheses suggested by qualitative data: Poor households with a 
migrant between 1984 and 1994 (or a remitter between 1993 and 1994) gain productive assets 
from 1994 to 2000, while rich households with a migrant lose productive assets. Regardless of 
initial wealth status, households with a migrant (or a remitter) do not experience a change in 
consumer assets. Qualitative data suggest potential mechanisms for these patterns. Poor 
households seem to benefit from migration due to reduced consumption needs as well as 
potential remittances, while rich households often suffer because of reduced labor force for local 
economic activities.  
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Background 
Remittances from internal or international migrants comprise a critical component of economic 
outcomes in the developing world reaching 20 per cent of the GDP in many countries (Ratha et 
al. 2011). The key debates in the literature have revolved around the impact of remittance flows 
on poverty and inequality. 
 
Many studies showed remittances reduce poverty (Adams 2006; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; 
Adams and Page 2005; Taylor, Adams and Mora 2009) and initiate a development dynamic by 
lessening the production and investment constraints in the economy (Goldring 1990; Rozelle, 
Taylor and DeBrauw 1999; Stark 1991; Stark and Lucas 1988; Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki 1988; 
Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1996), by providing income growth opportunities (Durand et al. 
1996a; Massey  and Parrado 1998) or by creating a vessel for risk diversification (Lauby and 
Stark 1988). Ample evidence from different settings established how remittances help migrants 
establish small businesses in origin (Funkhouser 1992; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007), afford 
better education for their children (Edwards and Ureta 2003; Yang 2008) and accumulate wealth 
(Garip 2012; Greenwood 1985; Taylor 1992; Taylor and Wyatt 1996). 
 
Research also suggested remittances may produce a cycle of dependency and stunted 
development in the origin (Papademetriou and Martin 1991; Reichart 1981; Wiest 1984) 
especially if the funds are spent on consumption rather than income- or employment-generating 
productive activities, hence contributing to a way of life that cannot be sustained in the long run 
or through local means (Brown and Alhburg 1999; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Massey  and 
Basem 1992; Mills 1999; Mines 1982; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Russell 1992). But recent   5 
work showed that remittances – even used for consumption – generate strong ‘multiplier’ effects 
in the receiving economy (Durand et al. 1996a; Taylor et al. 1996). 
 
A related debate in the literature considered the impact of migration and remittances on 
economic disparities in receiving countries. Several studies found that remittance flows 
decreased income or wealth inequalities (Adams 1992; Taylor 1992; Taylor et al. 2009), while 
others observed the opposite pattern (Mora 2005). Recent work attempted to reconcile these 
patterns by showing how the impact of remittances on inequality depends on the cost (Ebeke and 
Le Goff 2011) or level of migration (Garip 2012; Koechlin and Leon 2007; McKenzie and 
Rapoport 2007). 
 
This study contributes to both debates with an analysis of internal migration in Thailand. 
Remittances from internal migrants – although smaller in magnitude compared those from 
international migrants – comprise a vital component of rural livelihoods in many developing 
countries (Reardon 1997; Rempel and Lobdell 1978). Studies in the Thai setting obtained mixed 
results on the economic impact of internal migration and remittances. Ford et al. (2009), for 
example, found that remittances have no effect on asset accumulation in Kanchanaburi province, 
while Entwisle and Tong (2005) observed strong positive effects in Nang Rong.  
 
This study seeks to move beyond prior work by not only evaluating the economic effects of 
migration and remittance flows, but by also suggesting the reasons for those effects using a 
mixed-methods approach. I first rely on qualitative data from focus group interviews to develop 
hypotheses about the economic impact of migration and remittance choices. I then test these   6 
hypotheses through a rigorous statistical analysis of longitudinal survey data. Finally, I return to 
qualitative data to understand the potential mechanisms underlying the observed statistical 
regularities.  
 
Analytical Strategy 
The Thai setting 
The study uses qualitative and survey data from Nang Rong, a district in the historically poor 
Northeastern region of Thailand, and an important source of migrants to urban areas. Migration 
flows from this region gained steam from mid-1980s to mid-1990s, when Thailand led the world 
in economic growth (Jansen 1997). This growth, fuelled mostly by production in export 
manufacturing, led to an increased demand for labor in urban destinations (Bello, Cunningham 
and Li 1998), and attracted rural migrants, mostly from the Northeast region, to factory, 
construction and service jobs at unprecedented rates (Mills 1999). The period of expansive 
growth slowed down in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the export growth slumped from over 20 percent 
to zero, partly due to increasing competition from China and India. In 1997, the Asian financial 
crisis hit Thailand leading to a devaluation of the Thai currency, baht, and precipitating a brief 
recession. Unemployment rates increased as a consequence, and migration flows from rural to 
urban regions slowed down. The survey data capture this roller coaster period of economic boom 
and bust in the country, leading to dramatic changes in migration and remittance flows between 
rural and urban regions. 
 
 
   7 
 
Generating hypotheses from qualitative data 
The study first employs qualitative data from focus group interviews conducted in 8 rural 
villages in Nang Rong in 2005 to generate hypotheses about the effect of migration and 
remittances on wealth accumulation. In each village, the headman helped us identify 6 to 8 
participants (typically equal number of men and women) for each of the three focus groups: (i) 
village leaders (village headman, village committee members, mothers group members), (ii) 
migrant-sending household members, and (iii) return migrants. I trained and supervised three 
graduate students from Mahidol University. One student, who spoke the Northeastern dialect, ran 
the focus group discussions – which lasted from one to two hours – and asked open-ended 
questions about the reasons for and consequences of migration and remittance decisions. The 
remaining two students took notes, recorded and simultaneously translated the discussion. The 
fieldwork lasted four weeks and recruited a total of 158 respondents. Three bilingual research 
assistants transcribed the data and translated them into English. The data were then compiled in a 
word-processing document and organized around various themes, 
 
The fieldwork observations suggested that migration and remittances often positively contribute 
to household economies in Nang Rong. A headman told us that in his village, “Some migrant 
households have improved so much from remittances that they are now richer than [initially] rich 
households.” A village committee member similarly commented: “Migrant households receive 
remittances and become rich. In our village, the richest person is not the Kamnan (the town 
chief) but one of the migrant villagers.” 
   8 
Many parents talked about the contributions of their migrant children. A mother of migrants, for 
example, stated: “We were poor and had nothing to live on. There was nothing to do here, no 
farmland for us… If [my children] had stayed, we would have to feed them. They went with our 
blessing because we understood they wanted to help support the family.” When asked about 
remittances, the mother replied: “That is the reason why I sent my children away.” Another 
mother echoed: “When my kids went, I was happy. I was eagerly waiting for them to remit some 
money home every month so that we would have money to spend.” Return migrants also 
recognized the benefits of their absence to the household economy: “There are more expenses if 
the children stay home. If we go away to work, there are less people home, and it is less 
expensive to feed the family.” Thus, in poor households, migrants helped the household 
economy not only by sending back remittances, but also by the sheer fact of leaving and 
relieving the household’s burden of supporting them. 
 
The experiences of households that owned land, however, were different. A father, whose three 
sons migrated, told us about the devastating effect of that move on the household economy: 
“Before, three men helped work in the rice field, so things were easier. Now I don’t have any 
help.” Similarly, a return migrant acknowledged the negative effect of his migration decision on 
the household: “It might have been better for me to stay in the village because we had land. 
When I migrated for work, no one took care of the land, so we had to rent it out.”  
 
In rich households, then, migration implied a loss in the labor force available for local economic 
activities. Some migrants, realizing the effect of their departure, sent remittances to make up for 
their absence, as one migrant told us: “The money [I send] is mainly for hiring help with the   9 
farm.” But in most cases, migrants from wealthier households chose not to. A village headman 
explained this pattern: “They think that their father is already well-off… not in any difficulty, so 
they don’t send money. [Migrants] are still teenagers, so they go out and spend all their money.” 
In fact, in some cases, migrants from wealthy households asked for money. The father of the 
three migrant sons, for example, told us: “No one sends me money. Whenever they come, I give 
them money.”  
 
These observations suggest that households’ initial economic status determines the labor needs in 
the origin, and thus, the potential impact of migration on the household economy. In poor 
households, the departure of young adults seems beneficial as it relieves the consumption burden 
and potentially brings remittances. In rich households, the opportunity cost of losing young 
adults is higher due to household’s local economic activities. Accordingly, migration may be 
detrimental especially if the migrants do not send remittances in lieu of their domestic labor.  
 
Based on these observations, I hypothesize that the impact of having a migrant or a remitter will 
vary by households’ wealth status. Poor households with a migrant will gain more assets 
compared to those without a migrant, all else equal. Poor households with a remitting migrant 
will gain more assets compared to those with a non-remitting migrant. Rich households with a 
migrant, by contrast, will lose more assets compared to those without a migrant. But rich 
households with a remitting migrant will gain more assets compared to those with a non-
remitting migrant. 
 
   10 
These hypotheses qualify some of the mixed findings on the impact of migration on household 
wealth. Many studies have found that migration increases household investments through 
remittances (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2001; Lucas 1987; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Yang 
2008), while others have argued that migration diminishes household investments by reducing 
the labor endowment (Miluka et al. 2010; Rozelle et al. 1999) or efficiency (Itzigsohn 1995). Our 
hypotheses connect these two sets of findings, and suggest that the impact of migration on 
household wealth depends on the household’s initial wealth status. 
 
Prior research distinguished between migrants’ investments in productive and consumer assets, 
suggesting that the former leads to greater economic growth in the long run (Durand et al. 1996a; 
Massey  and Parrado 1998). Qualitative data provided mixed evidence on how households 
utilized remittance funds in the Nang Rong villages. Asked about how remittances have 
contributed to her household’s welfare, for example, the mother of a migrant responded: “My life 
is much better than before. I now own a home and farmland.” Referring to a successful migrant, 
a headman described: “[With remittance money] he bought cattle worth of 200,000 baht. He also 
bought land for his wife worth 200,000-300,000 baht [about 4000-6000 US$].” A return migrant 
similarly explained that he “opened a grocery store for [his] wife with remittance income.”  
 
Although such examples of productive use of remittances were numerous, a considerable share 
of respondents spent remittances to buy consumer goods. Some respondents actually received 
household appliances from migrants instead of money. The mother of a migrant daughter told us: 
“Sometimes they [migrants] do send back some small commodities like clothes or small 
electronic devices. It is quite rare to get microwaves, fridges and other big stuffs, but two or three   11 
of us do get those things.” Similarly, a return migrant explained: “Those whose children remit 
have a TV and a fridge.” A return migrant remarked on the gender differences: “Men usually 
spend money on new cars, new motorcycles.... They’re less likely to open a business compared 
to women.” 
 
These mixed observations do not suggest a clear direction on whether migrant households invest 
in productive or consumer assets, thus, I pose this as an empirical question for the survey data. 
 
Survey data 
To test the hypotheses, I use the Nang Rong survey data collected in three waves in 1984, 1994 
and 2000. The 1984 wave was a census of 51 villages in Nang Rong (including the 8 villages 
selected for fieldwork), and collected information on individual demographics, household assets 
and village characteristics. The 1994 and 2000 waves replicated the 1984 census, following all 
1984 respondents still living in the original 51 villages and adding any new residents. The 1994 
and 2000 household rosters recorded if a household member from the previous wave moved out 
of the village two months or more prior to the survey, and whether those who moved out sent 
money or goods to the household in the past 12 months. The rosters also collected detailed 
records of household assets. These data are used to compute the key indicators for analysis.  
  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis falls roughly in the middle of the study period. Our data cannot 
capture the immediate response to the crisis. But, migration and remittance behaviors show 
remarkable consistency over time. 93 (78) per cent of households that had migrants (remitters) 
according to the 1994 survey also had migrants (remitters) in the 2000 survey. Therefore, I   12 
expect the 1994 measures to provide a good proxy for the migration and remittance patterns after 
the 1997 crisis. 
 
Measuring Wealth Change 
The analysis seeks to evaluate how having a migrant or a remitter in the household prior to 1994 
affects subsequent changes in assets from 1994 to 2000. Migrants are defined as individuals who 
were members of their households in 1984, but moved out of the village two months or more 
prior to the 1994 survey. Remitters are defined as migrants who sent money or goods (food, 
clothing, household items, electrical appliances or vehicles) to their households in the 12 months 
preceding the survey (as reported by the household members in origin). 
 
To measure the change in household assets from 1994 and 2000, I created an aggregate index 
from 14 asset categories measured in both years. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I applied 
principal components analysis (PCA), but retained the ordinal measures by using polychoric 
rather than Pearson’s correlation (Kolenikov and Angeles 2009). The polychoricpca routine in 
Stata generated weights for the 14 asset indicators in the pooled data from 1994 and 2000. These 
indicators included counts (number of cows, buffalos or pigs, number of TVs, VCRs, 
refrigerators, cars, motorcycles, itans (small tractors), tractors and sewing machines), and 
categorical variables (house has windows, household uses gas or electricity for cooking, whether 
water is piped into household).
 1 To avoid arbitrary weighting in PCA due to differences in scale, 
I used three categories for the count measures. For the cattle indicators, the categories included a 
                                                 
1 Household land is measured inconsistently across survey waves, and excluded from the asset index computation. 
While the 1984 and 1994 surveys captured both the total amount of land owned and land used, the 2000 survey only 
asked about the latter. The exclusion of land does not affect the main results. Alternative models of productive asset 
change (where the asset index includes land owned in 1994 and land used in 2000) produce qualitatively similar 
results (available upon request) to those presented here.   13 
group of zero values (the majority of cases) and two groups for low and high levels of ownership 
based on the median of non-zero values. The counts of assets were top-coded at two (the higher 
values contain less than one percent of the sample).  
 
A separate PCA generated weights for the assets in the 1984 survey, which included a different 
set of indicators. I did not include the 1984 data in the global PCA above because it would force 
us to drop several indicators measured in 1994 and 2000. The 1984 asset index is not a central 
measure for our analysis and only serves as a control for baseline wealth. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
Table 1 displays the scoring coefficients of the first principal component given by the polychoric 
PCA of the pooled data from 1994 and 2000. The left-hand-side panel reports the coefficients for 
productive assets: (i) farming tools (itans and tractors), and (ii) cattle (cows, buffalos and pigs). 
The right-hand-side panel reports the coefficients for consumer assets: (i) housing quality 
(windows, type of cooking fuel, water pipe), and (ii) durables (TVs, VCRs, refrigerators, cars, 
motorcycles, and sewing machines). (Some of the consumer assets can be considered productive. 
For example, household members may use a car or motorcycle for work, or a sewing machine to 
produce clothing to be sold. This alternative classification does not change any of the results.) 
Household indices for productive and consumer assets are computed by summing up the value of 
each indicator weighted by the corresponding PCA coefficient. For ease of interpretation, the 
asset indices are scaled to range between 0 and 10. The change in household assets is measured 
by subtracting the 1994 (productive or consumer) index from its 2000 value.    14 
 
Modeling Households’ Migration and Remittance Choices 
Our analysis begins with two logit models of (i) whether a household has any migrants recorded 
in the 1994 survey (who may have moved any time from 1984 to 1994), and (ii) whether any of 
the migrants send remittances in the year preceding the survey. These models help demonstrate 
the selectivity in migration and remittance choices, which the subsequent models for wealth 
change correct for. For the first model, let   denote the probability that household 
i has a migrant. The log-odds of migrating relative to not migrating, denoted  , is a linear 
function of relevant characteristics  , 
 
         (1) 
where   represents the vector of coefficients. The second model is identical, but considers the 
probability that household i receives remittances given that it has a migrant. 
 
The surveys did not collect information on the exact timing of migration, which may have 
occurred any time from right after the 1984 (1994) survey to two months prior to the 1994 
(2000) survey.  All indicators in the migration model are kept at 1984 values to ensure that they 
capture the conditions prior to migration. Number of seniors (aged 65 or more) and children 
(aged 14 or less) indicate the dependents in the household, while the age of the household head, 
number sons and daughters (aged 15 or more), and mean years of education capture the potential 
for mobility in the household. Indices of household productive and consumer assets in 1984 
measure household’s baseline wealth. Indicators for whether household had any prior migrants 
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and the percentage of ever-migrants in village (both aggregated from the 1984 household 
survey)
2 proxy the prevalence of migration behavior. The indicators for electrification, number 
of rice mills and presence of a primary or secondary school capture the village development 
level. Months of water shortage in the village measure risks to farming income. Time to district 
proxies distance to urban centers, and hence, the cost of migrating. 
 
The remittance model includes four additional indicators that measure migrant characteristics as 
recorded in the 1994 survey. (Because migration, by definition, precedes remittance behavior, 
simultaneity bias is not a concern.) The indicators for the number of male and female migrants 
seek to capture the gendered remittance patterns. The average years of education among migrants 
indicates the earning potentials in destination. Finally, the percentage of remitters among 
households in the village (aggregated from the 1994 household survey) measures the collective 
remittance behavior.  
 
[TABLE 2 ] 
 
Table 2 summarizes the sample characteristics by households’ migration and remittance status as 
reported in the 1994 survey. Households with migrants have a higher number of seniors and 
children as well as older sons and daughters, higher average education, but are poorer in 
productive assets than non-migrant households. Among households with migrants, those 
receiving remittances have a higher number of sons and daughters and a higher number of male 
and female migrants. Migrants are more likely to come from households with prior migrants and 
                                                 
2 Migrants are defined as ‘temporarily absent’ household members, whose reason for moving is reportedly related to 
education or work.    16 
villages with a higher percentage of migrants, and remitters from villages with a higher 
percentage of remitters (p<0.05, two-tailed, for all mentioned differences). This descriptive 
analysis suggests the explanatory power of the selected variables for migration and remittance 
outcomes. 
  
Modeling Wealth Change 
The main analysis of the paper tests the effect of migration and remittance decisions (binary 
indicators introduced in two separate models) on the change in households’ productive and 
consumer asset indices from 1994 to 2000. The hypotheses suggest that the effect might vary 
across wealth groups; thus, the analysis is run separately for poor, medium-wealth and rich 
households. The wealth categories are based on the tertiles of the productive asset index, but the 
robustness of the results to alternative categorizations is established in Table A1 of Appendix A. 
The wealth change models include all the controls in the migration and remittance models.  
 
To set a baseline, I start with an ordinary least square (OLS) estimation. The model expresses the 
change in household i’s assets from 1994 to 2000   as a function of household’s 
migration decisions prior to 1994    and other relevant characteristics   (measured in 
1984), 
    (2) 
where λ  and α are the corresponding coefficients and   is the error term. A second model 
estimates the effect of remittance behavior prior to 1994   on asset change among 
households with migrants. Based on the definitions in the questionnaires, migration could have 
occurred anytime from 1984 to two months prior to the 1994 survey (indicated as 84→94 in the 
€ 
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variable subscript). Remittances could be sent anytime during the 12 months preceding the 1994 
(indicated as 93→94 in the variable subscript).
3  
 
I focus on the change in assets in order to control for unobserved time-invariant factors that 
might affect a household’s assets in both 1994 and 2000. By comparing the change in households 
with a migrant (or a remitter) to that in households without a migrant (or a remitter), I also 
account for unobserved time-varying factors to the extent that those factors affect both types of 
households similarly. This method (also known as “difference-in-differences”) assumes that, in 
the absence of migration or remittances, all households would have experienced similar changes 
in wealth from 1994 to 2000 (controlling for the observed characteristics). A descriptive analysis 
suggested by Gertler et al. (2011), and available upon request, suggested no threat to this “equal 
trends” assumption.  
 
OLS regression also assumes treatment effects to be constant in the population, but, in reality, 
households may assign themselves to treatment (having a migrant or a remitter) based on 
expectations about the outcome (change in assets). This endogenous selection leads to 
heterogeneity in the treatment effects. (Put differently, households do not randomly send 
migrants or receive remittances, thus, a simple comparison of the change in assets across 
households’ migration-remittance choices confounds the effect of those choices with the 
selection process into those choices.)  Matching methods account for this heterogeneity by 
                                                 
3 I restrict the analysis to migration decisions reported in the 1994 survey to ensure that the decisions are strictly 
prior to the changes in wealth from 1994 to 2000. I exclude from the sample 835 households that reported no 
migrants in the 1994 survey, but had a migrant in the 2000 survey (final N = 4,614). Thus, I compare households 
with a migrant in the 1994 survey to those without a migrant in both the 1994 and 2000 surveys. Similarly, in testing 
the effect of remittances on wealth change, I take out 531 households that reported no remitters in 1994, but had a 
remitter in 2000 (final N = 2,687).    18 
balancing the covariates between the treatment and control groups, and thus ‘undoing’ the 
selection into treatment, given that the selection is based on observable characteristics.
4 (In our 
case,  
 
Prior research on wealth accumulation in Thailand relied on matching methods to correct for 
heterogeneous treatment effects (Ford et al. 2009). These methods use a distance measure to 
group similar observations from the treated and control cases (e.g., households with and without 
migrants) into ‘matched’ categories. A popular distance measure is the Mahalanobis distance 
based on the Euclidean distance between the covariate vectors of each pair of observations 
weighted by the sample covariance matrix. Using this measure, I performed one-to-one nearest 
neighbor matching using the same covariates, x, included in OLS with psmatch2 routine in 
Stata. I removed the treated units that are outside the common support of the control units as well 
as those that are more distant to the controls than a selected caliper (cut-off for the maximum 
distance allowed). I used a caliper of 2 to match migrants to non-migrants and a caliper of 5 to 
match remitters to non-remitters (among migrants).
5 I repeated the matching for each subsample 
                                                 
4 Endogenous selection is especially problematic for remittance receipts, as households with a migrant can exercise 
the option to ask for remittances under economic duress. But the matching method used here, along with the 
descriptive analysis testing the equal trends assumption, reduce its viability to households that do not show any 
visible signs of wealth change prior to 1994, but still expect one between 1994 and 2000, and receive remittances as 
a result. The IV method applied later further reduces the potential sources of endogeneity to time-variant 
unobservables that affect both wealth change and the selected instruments (that is, the percentage of remitters among 
sibling and village ties). 
5 A common concern with the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching is that it can discard a large number of 
observations that are not selected as matches (Stuart 2010). An alternative method, Kernel matching, includes all 
observations, matching treated units with a weighted average of all controls. The weights are inversely proportional 
to the distance between the treated and control pairs. The estimates from this method (available upon request) are 
very similar to those from one-to-one nearest neighbor matching.   19 
(poor, medium-wealth and rich households) and computed the standard errors for the estimates 
with the bootstrap.
6 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Table 3 compares covariate and propensity score (the predicted probability of treatment given 
the covariates) means in the overall and the restricted ‘matched’ sample for two treatments of 
interest (having a migrant or a remitter) across three wealth groups. For each covariate, the table 
reports the standardized difference of means, that is, 
 
        (3)
 
to quantify the bias between treatment and control samples (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985), where   
 and    represent the mean and standard deviation of the covariate in the treatment sample, 
and    and    denote the same statistics in the control sample.  
 
Panel A shows the standardized mean differences in all covariates for a subsample of poor 
households. In the unmatched sample, the differences between the treatment and control groups 
are considerable. The bias for the age of the household, for example, is about 90 percent 
(suggesting that the difference in means for the treatment and control groups is 90 percent as 
                                                 
6 Abadie and Imbens (2008) questioned the use of the bootstrap for calculating standard errors, and provided an 
alternative estimator (Abadie and Imbens 2006, 2011). The results obtained with this estimator (available upon 
request) are very similar to those with the bootstrap standard errors. 
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large as the standard deviation). The bias drops to 11 percent in the matched sample (an 88 
percent reduction). Other covariates display similar rates of reduction in bias suggesting dramatic 
improvements in balance. 
 
Panels A to F also show the standardized differences in propensity scores for different 
subsamples (poor, medium-wealth and rich households) and treatments (having a migrant or a 
remitter). In all six cases, the standardized difference in the matched sample is much smaller than 
50 percent, the upper bound suggested by Rubin (2001) for the regression adjustment to be 
reliable. Each panel also shows the ratio of the variances of the propensity score in the treatment 
and control groups in the matched sample. In all cases, the ratio is close to one (and invariably 
between 0.5 and 2) indicating acceptable balance according to Rubin’s (2001) rule-of-thumb. 
Finally, Table B1 in Appendix B shows the robustness of the final results to caliper size. It also 
demonstrates the trade-off between the size of the matched sample and the size of the caliper 
(inversely related to the degree of covariate balance). 
 
Matching methods are not robust to potential bias arising from unobserved variables that affect 
both assignment to treatment (migrating and remitting) and the outcome (change in assets). 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation provides an alternative method for identifying treatment 
effects in such cases (implemented in the treatreg routine in Stata for binary treatments). The 
method relies on the availability of an instrument, a variable that affects the probability of 
treatment, but not the outcome (nor any unobserved variables affecting the outcome).  
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Prior work has relied on an indicator of migration prevalence in the community as an instrument 
for selecting into migration (Hoddinott 1994; Mora 2005; Taylor, Rozelle and DeBrauw 2003). 
Similar to this work, I used the percentage of migrants in the village prior to 1984 as an 
instrument for migration. Additionally, I computed the percentage of migrants in household’s 
sibling network in 1984. The sibling network includes the households where the members of the 
ego household have at least one sibling (often due to marriage) in 1994. Similarly, for remittance 
behavior, I used two instruments: the percentage of remitters in the community and in the 
household’s sibling network in 1984.  (The sibling network is measured in 1994, but I computed 
the aggregate migration or remittance behavior in that network in 1984. Some of the network ties 
in 1994 may be absent in 1984. To consider this possibility, I excluded the ties to siblings who 
were younger than 35 in 1984 as those siblings may still be living in the ego individual’s 
household then. The results, however, were robust to their inclusion.) 
 
This estimation strategy relies on the assumption that the instruments affect changes in 
household wealth only indirectly through their effect on migration (or remittances). This 
exogeneity assumption is essentially untestable, but one can consider potential threats to its 
validity. One potential threat is that village characteristics may have determined prior migration 
or remittance rates as well as current opportunities for wealth gain. To consider this possibility, I 
included controls for the availability of infrastructure (electrification, schools, rice mills) and 
village distance to district measured in 1984 - the same year as the migration (and remittance) 
prevalence indicators. I also included indicators of household size and education, which may 
affect both past migration and remittance decisions in the sibling network and recent trends in 
household wealth.    22 
 
A second potential threat is that the members of the sibling network may have remitted to the 
ego household, contributing to that household’s asset gain directly. To discard this possibility, I 
excluded from the sample 388 households with ties to households where the members reported 
remitting to other households than their own. Despite the introduction of the household and 
village-level controls and the sample restrictions, the instruments remained strong predictors of 
migration and remittance decisions in 1994, with F-statistics (displayed in Table 5) typically 
higher than or close to the lower bound of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to reject the 
hypothesis of weak instruments. 
 
A lingering threat to validity involves the possibility that past migration and remittance rates are 
associated with the unobserved determinants of wealth change. In that case, one would expect 
those rates to be correlated with other measures, such as household’s local labor force, that are 
highly predictive of wealth change. I examined the partial correlations between the instruments 
and number of individuals involved in local economic activities in 1994. The regression results 
(available from the author) showed that both instruments have statistically insignificant 
associations with household economic activities for all wealth categories. These analyses suggest 
the proposed instruments as valid sources of identification. 
 
Results  
Modeling Households’ Migration and Remittance Choices  
Table 4 presents the odds ratios from two logit models of households’ migration and remittance 
choices, which allow us to demonstrate the selectivity in these choices – and to suggest potential   23 
underlying behavioral mechanisms – in the Thai setting. The estimates in the first column show 
that the odds of having a migrant increase with the age of the household head, the number of 
children in the household, but decrease with the number of seniors in the household. The odds of 
remitting also increase with the number of children, suggesting a potential a contractual 
agreement between the household and the migrant to exchange childcare for remittances 
(Banerjee 1984; Itzigsohn 1995), and countering opposite findings in the same setting (Osaki 
2003).  
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
The odds of migrating increase with the number of sons and daughters (older than 15) in the 
household. This pattern may reflect a competition for future inheritances, where sons or 
daughters opt to show their worth by migrating and remitting, or a simple crowding-out effect 
where young adults leave large households for better opportunities. Given that the odds of 
remitting also increase with the number of daughters (the more likely heirs in the Thai context), 
the inheritance-seeking hypothesis seems more viable, and is supported by prior evidence from 
Thailand (Chamratrithirong, Morgan and Rindfuss 1988; Curran, Garip and Chung 2005; 
VanWey 2004). The slightly higher effect sizes for daughters and female migrants compared to 
sons and male migrants support the gendered remittance patterns identified by Vanwey (2004). 
 
The odds of migration increase with the mean years of education in the household, possibly due 
to the higher returns to education in urban destinations compared to the rural origin. The odds of 
migration decrease with household’s productive and consumer assets in 1984, suggesting that   24 
individuals from poor households, those who have the least to lose and most to gain by 
migrating, are at the greatest risk to do so. This pattern, also identified in Osaki’s (2003) work 
and facilitated by the low financial costs of migrating in Thailand, could reflect an individual 
strategy to maximize income in line with the neoclassical theory of migration (Todaro 1969), or 
a household strategy to overcome credit constraints as argued by the new economics of labor 
migration (NELM) (Stark and Taylor 1989). The latter implies that migrants from poor 
households should be more likely to send remittances to reach household economic objectives. 
The data support this pattern; the odds of receiving remittances are higher in poor households 
(measured by consumer assets). 
  
Migration is more likely in communities with a higher percentage of migrants, and remittances in 
communities with a higher percentage of remitters. Both patterns suggest that individuals or 
households may respond to social influences or resources from prior migrants or remitters as 
argued by the cumulative causation theory of migration (Massey 1990). An alternative 
explanation, which considers the lingering economic pressures that lead past behavior to be 
correlated with current decisions, has been discarded with longitudinal data from Nang Rong in 
other work (Garip and Curran 2011, Garip 2008). 
 
Modeling Wealth Change 
Panel A of Table 5 shows results from OLS, matching, and IV models of the change in 
households’ productive assets from 1994 to 2000 estimated separately for poor, medium-wealth 
and rich households. Wealth categories are based on the tertiles of the productive asset index in 
1994. The dependent variable is standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The primary   25 
variables of interest, whether a household has any migrants in the 1994 survey, and whether 
those migrants send remittances, are introduced separately in the left- and right-hand-side 
columns.  
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
The three estimation strategies, with different set of assumptions, yield remarkably similar 
results. For poor households, having a migrant is associated with a 0.38-standard deviation 
increase in productive assets according to OLS. This effect is slightly lower (0.33) in the 
matching model, and highest (0.42) in the IV model. For medium-wealth households, having a 
migrant is related to a 0.20-standard deviation decrease in productive assets, an effect closely 
mirrored in the matching model, but insignificant in the IV model. For rich households, having a 
migrant leads to a devastating 0.36-standard deviation decrease in productive assets, an effect 
replicated in the matching (-0.39) and IV (-0.35) estimates. 
 
The three models also yield consistent estimates of the effect of remittances on household assets 
(among those with migrants). For poor households, having a remitter is associated with a 0.45-
standard deviation gain in productive assets according to OLS, an effect that is slightly larger in 
the matching (0.56) model, and the largest in the IV (0.72). For medium-wealth households, 
having a remitter has no effect on productive assets in any of the models. For rich households, 
having a remitter is related to a 0.32-standard deviation loss in productive assets, an effect that is 
larger in the matching (-0.38) model, but insignificant in the IV. The negative effect in first two 
models is likely due to unobserved factors that are correlated with both having a remitter and   26 
wealth change. (For example, rich households may be receiving remittances only if they are 
already losing wealth due to unobserved economic difficulties.) The IV estimate takes account of 
such unobserved characteristics, and, thus, is given the highest weight here.  
 
Panel B of Table 6 repeats the same analysis for consumer assets. In all wealth groups, and 
across the three estimation strategies, having a migrant or a remitter has no effect on the changes 
in consumer assets, with one exception: The effect of having a migrant is negative for poor 
households in the OLS model. But this result is not supported by the alternative models, so not 
given any weight here. 
 
Discussion 
The results generally support the hypotheses generated from qualitative data. Poor households 
with a migrant gain more assets compared to those without a migrant, and those with a remitting 
migrant gain more assets compared to those with a non-remitting migrant. By contrast, rich 
households with a migrant lose more assets compared to those without a migrant. In contrast to 
our hypothesis, rich households with a remitting migrant experience similar, not higher, wealth 
gain compared to those with a non-remitting migrant. One explanation for this pattern - that rich 
households do not receive sufficiently large remittances to instigate wealth gain – could be tested 
with more refined data on remittance amounts in future work. Finally, the results contribute to 
the empirical debate on migrant investments by showing that having a migrant or a remitter is 
associated with the changes in households’ productive, but not consumer, assets. 
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The qualitative data suggest the differential labor needs in origin as a potential mechanism for 
the observed differences in wealth change in poor and rich households, and the survey data 
provide some supporting evidence. In 1984, prior to migration, poor and medium-wealth 
households engaged in an average of 3.7 and 3.8 economic activities (land cultivation, animal 
raising, cloth weaving, silkworm raising, food preservation, bamboo and basket weaving, and 
vegetable gardening). Rich households, by contrast, participated in 4.3 activities on average, a 
significantly higher number (p<0.001). Similarly, poor and medium-wealth households both had 
around 1.6 members per economic activity, while rich households had the significantly lower 
number of 1.5 (p<0.001). These patterns confirm that rich households may face higher 
opportunity costs to sending migrants.  
 
Given these costs, then, why do rich households still send migrants?  A potential explanation is 
an intergenerational maximization model, where parents invest in migration to transfer low-
return resources in rural areas (e.g., land) to higher-return resources in urban destinations (e.g., 
education for the migrant). This model implies that rich households may benefit from migration 
in the next generation. Our data cover a limited period of six years, thus do not allow us to test 
such long-term trajectories.
7 An alternative explanation builds on the within-household conflict 
suggested in focus group discussions. A village headman told us:  “if parents have enough 
money, they don’t want their children to go [migrate].” But, children sometimes ignore their 
parents’ wishes, as a return migrant explained: “I went to find work. [My parents] didn’t really 
want me to go, but I was stubborn.” A father of three migrant sons similarly told us: “[My sons] 
ran away. Maybe they were bored of working in the rice fields… The oldest son went first, and 
told the two younger brothers to follow.” These examples challenge the household-level 
                                                 
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this explanation.   28 
accounts such as the NELM theory, which presume joint decision-making between the migrant 
and other household members (Stark 1991; Stark and Taylor 1991). Prior work showed how 
gender hierarchies in the household produce conflict about women’s migration (Goss and 
Lindquist 1995; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). These findings contribute 
to that work, but suggest alternative, potentially intergenerational, sources of conflict, and 
similarly render the treatment of household as a unified decision-making unit questionable 
(Mahler and Pessar 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
This study evaluated the impact of internal migration and remittance flows on wealth 
accumulation and distribution in 51 rural villages in the Nang Rong district of Thailand. 
Migration literature remains bifurcated on these questions. Many studies found that remittances 
from migrants lead to productive asset accumulation, and therefore support economic growth in 
origin, while others showed that these funds are spent exclusively on consumption, and merely 
contribute to higher living standards that are unsustainable in the long run. Similarly, several 
studies claimed that remittances decrease economic disparities by closing the gap between the 
rich and the poor, while others have connected these funds to increasing economic inequalities in 
origin communities.  
     
To contribute to these debates, this study first used qualitative data from focus group interviews 
to generate hypotheses about the impact of migration and remittances on wealth accumulation in 
the internal migration setting of Thailand. The study then tested the hypotheses with survey data   29 
from 51 rural villages in Nang Rong, and returned to qualitative data to suggest potential 
mechanisms for the observed regularities.  
 
This mixed-methods approach yielded several insights. First, households’ migration and 
remittance choices had a significant effect on the level and nature of their subsequent 
investments. The direction of the effect, however, depended on households’ initial wealth status. 
Among the poorest one-third (based on the distribution of productive assets), households with a 
migrant gained more productive assets compared to those without a migrant; and households 
with a remitting migrant gained more compared to those with a non-remitting migrant. Many 
studies observed the latter pattern, but not the former, which the focus group participants 
attributed to reduced consumption needs in households with a migrant. 
 
In stark contrast, among the richest one-third, households with a migrant lost more productive 
assets compared to those without a migrant. One explanation for this pattern – supported by 
descriptive analysis – is provided by our respondents, who emphasized the existing investments 
of rich households in the origin, which require labor to maintain, and thus impose high 
opportunity costs to migration. Theoretically, migrants can compensate for their departure by 
sending remittances. But in the Thai data, households with a remitting migrant did not 
experience an additional asset gain compared to those with a non-remitting migrant, suggesting 
remittances may not be sufficiently large in magnitude, which could be tested in future work.  
 
Finally, the results established that while migration and remittances significantly affected the 
changes in households’ productive assets, these decisions had no impact on households’   30 
consumer asset investments.  These results show that migration and remittance flows lead to 
productive asset acquisitions among poor households, and carry potential for long-term 
economic growth. The same flows lead to losses among the rich, and thus are likely to have an 
equalizing effect on the wealth distribution in rural Thai villages. 
 
A shortcoming of this analysis is the lack of data to assess the impact of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on the changes in household assets. But our focus is on the differences in wealth gain (or 
loss) between households with and without migrants, thus, this omission is not problematic as 
long as we can assume that the crisis affected all households similarly, regardless of their 
migration choices. This assumption can be verified (or refuted) in future work if longitudinal 
data capturing household wealth immediately before and after the crisis became available to 
researchers. 
 
Overall, the findings suggest two fruitful research directions. The first is to consider households’ 
initial wealth as an important qualifier for the impact of migration on future investments. Prior 
work observes that migration may affect household investments through three channels: (i) by 
reducing the consumption needs, (ii) by changing the labor supply, and (iii) by generating 
remittances (Davis, Carletto and Winters 2010). Future work might question how households’ 
initial wealth interferes with each channel. A second direction is to develop more complex 
behavioral models of migration. Prevailing models depict migration as an individual strategy to 
maximize income (Todaro 1969) or a household strategy to diversify risks (Stark and Taylor 
1989). The findings here, for example, migration out of rich households despite subsequent 
economic loss, call these classic models into question. New models that take into account   31 
intergenerational dynamics (e.g., households maximizing income across multiple generations) or 
conflicts (e.g., sons and daughters migrating despite parents’ objections) may help us better 
understand these outlier cases. 
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Appendix A. Robustness of the results to alternative wealth categories 
Table A1 checks the robustness of the results to alternative wealth categorizations. The first row 
of Panel A reproduces the matching estimates presented in Table 5, where the wealth categories 
are based on the tertiles of the household productive index in 1994. The second row uses an 
alternative categorization, where the poorest one-fourth in productive assets is compared to the 
richest one-fourth and the remaining middle half. The third row employs the tertiles of household 
land owned in 1994 to determine wealth categories. The fourth row uses a simple sum of assets, 
where binary indicators for having land greater than 10 rai (4 acres), a tractor, an itan and a car 
are added and top coded at two to create three categories (0,1 and 2) that correspond to poor, 
medium-wealth and rich households respectively.  
 
[TABLE A1] 
 
The effect of having a migrant on productive assets is positive and significant for poor 
households in the first two categorizations based on the tertiles and quantiles of the productive 
asset index. The effect is negative and significant for medium-wealth households in the first 
categorization only. The effect is negative and significant for rich households in three of the four 
categorizations. The effect of having a remitter (among households with migrants) on productive 
assets is positive for poor households in the first two categorizations and negative for rich 
households across all categorizations except for the one based on land alone. Models in Panel B 
replicate the analysis for consumer assets. Regardless of the categorization, having a migrant or a 
remitter has no effect on the changes in consumer assets for all wealth groups. These results   33 
show certain consistency across alternative categorizations, establishing the robustness of the 
conclusions to various definitions of wealth. 
 
Appendix B. Sensitivity of the matching estimates to caliper size 
 
[TABLE B1] 
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Table 5. The effect of having a migrant or remitter in the 1994 survey on the change in productive household assets from 1994 to 2000, estimates from alternative 
methods   
   
Migration 
 
Remittances 
Method  Poor        Medium-
wealth        Rich 
  
Poor        Medium-
wealth        Rich 
A.  Change in productive assets                                           
  OLS regression  0.38  **  #  -0.20  **  # 
 
-0.36  ** 
 
0.45  **  #    -0.12  # 
   
-0.32  ** 
 
 
(0.05) 
   
  (0.05) 
     
(0.06) 
   
(0.07) 
   
  (0.06) 
     
(0.08) 
 
                                             
 
N  2401        2141        2263      1173        979        1050 
 
   
                     
                   
   
                     
                   
 
Nearest-neighbor matching1  0.33  ** 
 
  -0.29  ** 
   
-0.39  ** 
 
0.56  ** 
 
  -0.12 
     
-0.38  * 
   
(0.11) 
   
  (0.11) 
     
(0.12) 
   
(0.15) 
   
  (0.18) 
     
(0.17) 
                                               
 
N (matched pairs)  294        204        220      151        88        114 
 
 
% of migrants or remitters matched  23% 
      20% 
      20% 
   
15% 
      11% 
      13% 
 
   
                     
                   
   
                     
                   
 
Instrumental variables using sibling and village network2  0.42  ** 
 
  -0.15 
     
-0.35  * 
 
0.72  ** 
 
  -0.40 
     
-0.61 
 
   
(0.15) 
   
  (0.19) 
     
(0.18) 
   
(0.25) 
   
  (0.29) 
     
(0.39) 
 
                                             
 
First-stage F-statistic on instrument  25.56  ** 
 
  3.74  * 
 
  3.40  * 
 
18.66  ** 
 
  8.81  ** 
 
  7.68  ** 
 
N  2181        1941        2060      1150        951        1015 
 
B. Change in consumer assets3 
                                         
  OLS regression  0.04 
   
  -0.004 
     
0.02 
   
0.08 
   
  0.06 
     
0.07 
   
 
(0.05) 
   
  (0.05) 
     
(0.06) 
   
(0.07) 
   
  (0.08) 
     
(0.08) 
 
                                             
 
Nearest-neighbor matching1  0.06 
   
  -0.12 
     
0.21 
   
-0.09 
   
  0.05 
     
-0.02 
 
   
(0.11) 
   
  (0.11) 
     
(0.11) 
   
(0.15) 
   
  (0.17) 
     
(0.18) 
 
                                             
                                             
 
Instrumental variables using sibling and village networkc  -0.29  * 
 
  0.07 
     
-0.07 
   
-0.10 
   
  -0.17 
     
-0.59 
 
   
(0.15) 
   
  (0.21) 
     
(0.18) 
   
(0.28) 
   
  (0.36) 
     
(0.41) 
 
                                              Notes:  **p<0.01 and *p<0.05. The dependent variable in panel A (B) is the change in the index of productive (consumer) assets from 1994 to 2000 (standardized to mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1). Standard errors are in parentheses. Poor, medium-wealth and rich categories are based on the tertiles of the productive asset index in 1994.  
#p<0.05. Test of difference when the coefficient is compared to that in the subsequent wealth category (computed for the OLS estimates only). 
       
Source:  As for Table 1. 
1  Caliper is set to 2 (5) for the migration (remittance) models. Standard errors are bootstrapped.                           
2  The instruments in the  migration (remittance) model are (i) the percentage of migrants (remitters) in a household's sibling network in 1984, and (ii) the percentage of migrants 
(remitters) in an individual's village in 1984.  The sibling network includes all households where the individual has at least one sibling (often due to marriage) in 1994.  The 
network excludes siblings younger than 35 in 1984 (i.e., those who may still be living in the ego individual's household in 1984). The network also excludes individuals whose 
siblings remit to other households than their own in 1984. (These siblings may be remitting to the ego individual's household, and contributing to asset gain, thus rendering our 
assumption about the exogeneity of the instrument questionable.) 
 
  3  The number of observations for each model and wealth group, as well as the first-stage F-statistic for IV model, are identical to those in Panel A. 
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